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Foreign direct investment (FDI) brings host countries capital, productive facilities, and
technology transfers, as well as new jobs and management expertise. Thus it is important
to understand why in many countries FDI inflow is lower than it would be expected. The
goal of this study is to investigate factors determining flow of FDI in Georgia. The key
point of the analysis is the impact of stability of economic and legal environment on the
pattern of FDI. In particular, we show that (i) the variability of basic macroeconomic
fundamentals decreases the flow of FDI, (ii) high volatility of fiscal, business regulations
makes  FDI  smaller,  (iii)  unstable  economic  environment  does  not  attract  long  term
investors but mainly speculative capital. Based on theoretical findings we formulate clear
message to policy makers stating that in order to expect significant flow of long term and
non-speculative foreign capital, first of all, a stable economic and legal environment is
needed.
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The increasing openness of former Soviet Union (FSU) countries has lead not only to
expanded  trade  but  also  to  significant  increase  in  foreign  direct  investment  (FDI).
Currently, FDI is at the forefront of economic policy decisions in most of these countries,
as  it  is  expected  to  aid  in  the  successful  transition  to  a  market  economy,  improve
economic growth prospects, bring modern technology to the economy and to accelerate
enterprise restructuring. In fact, among the developing and transition countries of both
Europe and Asia, the fastest growing ones are the biggest recipients of FDI. The empirical
evidence suggests that for emerging economies, a one percentage point increase in FDI
(measured as a proportion of GDP) leads, ceteris paribus, to an extra 0.8 percentage point
increase in per-capita income (Bergsman, Broadman, Drebentsov, 2000). Moreover, FDI
brings at least four things of value: financial capital, management skills, technology, and
access to export markets, and therefore sustains growth.  
FDI differs from other forms of international capital movement in the manner and
duration  of  the  commitment  it  involves.  In  particular,  its  purpose  is  to  establish
permanent commercial relations, and at the same time to exert a noticeable managerial
influence over an enterprise. It is widely agreed that FDI takes place when three sets of
determining factors exist simultaneously (Dunning, 1993, Rugman, 1998):
– Ownership specific advantages (of property rights and intangible assets). They arise
from the firm's size and access to markets and resources, the firm's ability to co-ordinate
complementary  activities,  such  as  manufacturing  and  distribution,  and  the  ability  to
exploit differences between countries.
– Internalization incentive advantages, which arise from exploiting imperfections in
external markets. These include the reduction of uncertainty and transactions costs in
order to generate knowledge more efficiently; and the reduction of state-generated
imperfections such as tariffs, foreign exchange controls, and subsidies.
–  Location  specific  advantages,  which  include  differences  in  country  natural
endowments, transport costs, macroeconomic stability1, cultural factors and government
regulations. They determine which countries are host to multinational enterprises foreign
production.
If only the first condition is met, firms will rely on exports, licensing or the sale of
patents to service a foreign market. In the presence of internalization incentives (e.g.
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1 See e.g., Bailey and Tavlas (1991), Cukrowski (2001),  Cushman (1985), Goldberg and Kolstad (1995),
Sung and Lapan (2000).protection  from  supply  disruptions  and  price  hikes,  lack  of  suitable  licensee,  and
economies  of  common  governance)  FDI  becomes  the  preferred  mode  of  servicing
foreign markets, but only if location-specific advantages are present. Within the trinity of
conditions  for  FDI  to  occur,  locational  determinants are  the  only  ones  that  host
governments can influence directly2. 
Whereas it has not been possible to arrange firms' locational-specific decisions into a
uniform theoretical pattern so far, the literature cites a large number of very different
factors that impact on business potential and the risks associated with individual locations.
They can be grouped into three broad categories: 
– National policy framework for FDI. Without specific foreign investment legislation no
FDI will take place in a particular country. However, it has to be acknowledged, that while
the investment policy restrictions are very important in discouraging foreign investment,
investment policy incentives are only one variable attracting such investment3.  
–  Business  facilitation.  The  set  of  measures  that  facilitate  business  transactions
includes  business  promotion,  investment  incentives,  after-investment  services,
improvements  in  amenities,  and  measures  that  reduce  the  "hassle"  cost  (related  to
corruption and administrative efficiency) of doing business. Financial or fiscal incentives
are also used to attract investors, even though they typically figure into investor' location
decisions only when the economic determinants are in place4. 
– Economic motives. The most important determinants for the location of FDI are
economic  considerations.  They  come  into  full  play  once  an  enabling  FDI  policy
framework is in place. Following from the principal motivations for investing in foreign
countries,  economic  determinants  can  be  grouped  into  three  clusters,  such  as
resource-seeking, market-seeking and efficiency-seeking, as showed in Table 1. 
Availability of natural resources, cheap unskilled or semi-skilled labor, creative assets
and  physical  infrastructure  promotes  resource-seeking  activities.  Historically,  the  most
important host country determinant of FDI has been the availability of natural resources,
e.g. minerals, raw materials and agricultural products. In the nineteenth century "much of
the FDI by European and United States firms was prompted by the need to secure an
economic  and  reliable  source  of  minerals,  primary  products  for  the  investing
industrializing nations of Europe and North America" (Dunning, 1993). Up to the Second
World War, about 60% of the world stock of FDI was in natural resources. However,
even when it was prominent as an FDI determinant, the presence of natural resources by
itself was not sufficient for FDI to take place. Comparative advantage in natural resources
7
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2 World Investment Report: Trends and Determinants (1998). 
3 See Survey of OECD Work on International Investment (1998).
4 See Mallampally and Sauvant (1999).usually gave rise to trade rather than to FDI. Investment took place when resource-
abundant  countries  either  lacked  the  large  amounts  of  capital  typically  required  for
resource-extraction or did not have the technical skills needed to extract or sell raw
materials to the rest of the world. In addition, infrastructure facilities for getting the raw
materials out of the host country and to its final destination had to be in place or needed
to be created5.
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5 See World Investment Report: Trends and Determinants (1998).
Table 1. Host country determinants of FDI
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Market growth





Policy framework for FDI
Economic, political, and social stability
Rules regarding entry and operations
Standards of treatment of foreign
affiliates
Policies on functioning and structure
of markets (especially competition
and policies governing mergers and
acquisitions)
International agreements on FDI
Privatization policy
Trade policy (tariffs and nontariff










Technological, innovative, and other
created assets (for example, brand
names), including as embodied in
individuals, firms, and clusters





generating activities and investment-
facilitation services)
Investment incentives
Hassle costs (related to corruption
and administrative efficiency)
Social amenities (for example,




Cost of resources and assets listed
above, adjusted for labor
productivity
Other input costs, such as transport
and communication costs to/from
and within host economy and other
intermediate products
Membership of a regional
integration agreement conducive to
the establishment of regional
corporate networks
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998: Trends and Determinants. Table IV.1. p.91.Labor-seeking investment  is  usually  undertaken  by  manufacturing  and  service
multinational  enterprises  from  countries  with  high  real  labor  costs,  which  set  up  or
acquire subsidiaries in countries with lower real labor costs to supply labor intensive
intermediate or final products. Frequently, to attract such production, host countries
have  set  up  free  trade  or  export  processing  zones  (Dunning,  1993).  Another  highly
important group of economic determinants of FDI is called market factors, which are
market  size,  in  absolute  terms  as  well  as  in  relation  to  the  size  and  income  of  its
population,  and  market  growth.  For  firms,  new  markets  provide  a  chance  to  stay
competitive and grow within the industry as well as achieve scale and scope economies.
The motivation of efficiency seeking FDI is to rationalize the structure of established
resource based or market-seeking investment in such a way that the investing company
can  gain  from  the  common  governance  of  geographically  dispersed  activities.  The
intention  of  the  efficiency  seeking  firms  is  to  take  advantage  of  different  factor
endowments, cultures, institutional arrangements, economic systems and policies, and
market structures by concentrating production in a limited number of locations to supply
multiple markets. Moreover, in order for efficiency seeking foreign production to take
place, macroeconomic and political situation has to be stable, cross-border markets must
be both well developed and open. 
In  the  analysis  presented  in  this  paper  we  will  focus  on  the  link  between
macroeconomic and legal stability and inflow of FDI. These factors seem to be of great
importance  when  multinational  enterprises  have  to  choose  investment  location,  and
when several countries offer similar conditions to attract FDI. Furthermore, we intend to
show that macroeconomic and legal instability leads to adverse selection of the investors
and prove that in order to expect significant inflow of long term and non-speculative
foreign capital a stable economic and legal environment is needed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 characterizes inflow of FDI to Georgia.
Section 3 focuses on FDI environment in Georgia. In particular we discuss development
of legislative framework, and variability of macroeconomic conditions. In Section 4 we
present  and  analyze  a  simple  model  of  FDI  decision  making  under  uncertainty  of
economic  and  legal  environment.  Section  5  presents  international  experience  in
reforming FDI regime and Section 6 concludes.
2. Inflow of FDI to Georgia
Georgia should take full advantage of benefits associated with FDI inflow. Given the
country's geographical location, endowment, natural conditions and skilled labor force, as
9
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FDI record is rather discouraging. In spite of explicit efforts by government to attract
investors, Georgia has received far less FDI than it could. Since 1996, cumulative FDI
inflows to Georgia has been equal only to US$ 720.8 million. This level is very low in light
of Georgia's economic potential. It is also very low relative to other transition countries
of the region. On per capita basis FDI in Georgia (in 1999) was about US$ 20, compared
to US$ 91 in Azerbaijan and US$ 28 in Armenia. The amount of FDI inflow as a share of
10
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1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999




    Czech Republic 2720 5108 265 498 4,9 9,6
    Hungary 2036 1944 201 193 4,3 4,0
    Poland 5129 6757 132 174 3,3 4,4
















CIS 6791 5539 24 19 1,8 2,0
    Armenia 232 100 66 28 12,3 5,4
    Azerbaijan 1023 700 133 91 24,8 17,5
    Belarus 149 250 14 24 1,3 2,3
    Georgia 265 100 52 20 5,4 3,7
    Kazakhstan 1158 950 71 58 5,2 6,0
    Kyrgyzstan 109 5 24 1 6,8 0,4
    Moldova 86 49 20 11 5,1 4,2
    Russian
Federation
2761 2600 19 18 1,0 1,4
    Tajikistan 24 15 4 3 1,8 1,9
    Turkmenistan 64 80 15 18 2,3 2,4
    Ukraine 743 500 15 10 1,8 1,6
    Uzbekistan 176 184 7 8 1,2 1,1
* Average data for: Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungry, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
** Extrapolations of January-September rates were used. 
Source: Economic Survey of Europe 200. No.1. United Nations, New York and Geneva (Table 4.3.4.
p.143)GDP (in 1999) in Georgia was about 3,7 per cent what is much smaller than in neighbor
countries (17,5 percent of GDP in Azerbaijan and 5,4 per cent of GDP in Armenia).
Indicators of FDI in selected transition economies are presented in Table 2.
As it follows from Table 2 in last several years FDI inflow to Georgia is far from being
stable. In particular in 1998, FDI increased from US$ 236 million in 1997 to US$ 265
million in 1998 while in the next year fell significantly (to 100 million US$). Much of the
FDI was due to the work on oil pipeline linking Sanachal in Azerbaijan and Supsa in
Georgia (completed in early 1999). In 1998 investment in the oil pipeline was estimated
to be around US$ 174 million. Other major areas for FDI include energy and light industry
(e.g., food, glass, and pharmaceuticals). 
The largest source of FDI flows was the United States, World Bank, Great Britain,
Turkey and Russia (see Table 3). 
When  one  examines  the  countries  of  origin  of  foreign  direct  investment,  very
different patterns are revealed. In Table 3 it can be seen that the share of total FDI
accounted for by UK, for example, has dropped dramatically: in 1995 British's share was
over 58 per cent but  the share for the 2000s was only about 0.03 per cent. The opposite
general pattern has characterized FDI inflow from USA (1.2 per cent of total in 1995 and
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Table 3. Sources of foreign investment in Georgia (in percentage of total by year)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Australia -- -- 5.0 0.4 13.3 0.7
USA 1.2 1.2 16.1 32.7 30.7 19.5
UK 58.2 3.8 18.9 13.0 12.5 0.03
Germany -- 25.9 6.1 4.3 0.8 0.6
Turkey 0.3 9.8 5.4 6.6 5.7 28.3
Japan -- -- -- -- -- 3.0
Canada -- -- -- -- -- 17.3
Russia 5.2 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.1 10.1
Greece -- 0.9 3.8 6.5 6.2 --
France -- -- 1.3 4.6 4.2 1.1
Switzerland 12.1 22.1 11.9 0.4 -- 0.1
China -- -- -- -- -- 1.9
EBRD -- 16.5 -- 2.9 -- 1.2
World Bank 22.9 9.3 2.5 11.3 0.9 15.9
Source: Investment Opportunities in Georgia 2001, Ministry of State Property Management of Georgia
(p.11)19.5 per cent of total in 2000), and from the Russian Federation (5.2 per cent in 1995,
less then 1 per cent in 1996–1999 and 10.1 per cent in 2000).
3. FDI Environment in Georgia
3.1. Development of the Legislative Framework
During last decade Georgia was in the permanent process of the development of new
legislative  framework,  and  it  has  to  be  acknowledged  that  significant  progress  in
establishing the rule of law (i.e., the application of the due process of law, without regards
to the circumstances or individuals involved) has been achieved. Since 1995, laws enacted
by parliament (Figure 1.a) have increasingly displaced Presidential decrees as the main
vehicle of creation of legal environment (the number of Presidential decrees still remain
numerous (Figure 1.b), however, they are mainly used to instruct the executive to take
specified administrative actions rather than legislative actions).
In 1997, important legislative codes were approved for (i) a tax system, (ii) a custom
system, (iii) a civil code. During 1998–1999, the parliament passed Criminal Procedure Code,
Administrative  Code  (1998),  Criminal  Code,  and  Forest  Code  (1999).  It  has  to  be
acknowledged, however, that almost all of legal acts specified above have been periodically
amended (e.g., only in 1998 the tax code was amended in January, May, June, and November).
Certain progress has been made in adopting legislation that regulates a market economy
and  gives  basis  for  foreign  economic  activity  in  Georgia.  In  particular,  the  "Law  on
Enterpreneurs" defines the basic framework for enterpreneurship in Georgia; the "Law on
General Courts" provides a basis for comprehensive judicial reform of the court system; the
"Law on Bankruptcy Proceeedings" regulates bankruptcy proceedings held in Georgia and
rules of recognitions of bankruptcy proceedings held abroad; the "Law on declaration of
private ownership of nonagricultural land in use of physical and private legal persons" permits
sales of privately owned land; the "Law on administration and disposition of state owned
nonagricultural land" regulates the procedure of privatization and leasing of state land; the
"Law on Securities Market" creates a legal basis for securities market in Georgia; the "Law on
Accounting  and  Reporting"  determines  new  accounting  standards  consistent  with
internationally established principles; the "Law on State Property Privatization" determines
legal, organizational and social principles, as well as, the basic terms of privatization of state
property in Georgia; the "Law on Legal Status of Foreigners" regulates the main principles of
the  legal  status  of  foreigners  in  Georgia,  including  the  rights  to  work,  and  regulations
concerning property and personal non-property rights.
12
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 39 – J. Cukrowski, G. KavelashviliThe current Georgian investment law ("Low of Georgia on the Investment Activity
Promotion and Guarantees") guarantees that foreign investor's rights shall not be less than
the rights and guarantees enjoyed by Georgian natural and legal person. The law defines
registration requirements (in particular, license requirements for the following activities:
manufacture and sale of weapons and explosives; preparation and sale of medicines and
13
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lsubstances that are subject to special control; use of forest resources and entrails; setting
up of casinos and other gambling houses which provide for arranging games and lotteries;
banking  activity;  insurance  activity;  issue  of  securities  for  public  circulation;  wireless
communication service and TV and radio channels' creation; and "other activities defined
by the effective Georgian legislation") and procedures. Furthermore, it states explicitly
rights of foreign investors to convert the profit (income) gained from investments at the
market  rate  of  exchange  in  Georgian  banking  institutions  and  rights  to  unlimited
repatriation abroad. Licensing with the National Bank of Georgia is not required for
repatriation of interest payments on loans and profits from foreign investments; transfer
from Georgia, upon termination of investment activities, of hard currency previously
invested in Georgia; payments abroad for imported goods, services, works etc. 
It has to be stressed, however, that new regulations are far from being perfect, and most
of new laws has already undergone a number of amendments, and future reforms of the legal
environment are in progress. Moreover, enforcement of legislation is hampered by ambiguity
in many of the legal texts. Legal problems take a number of forms including: imprecise
definition  of  terms  in  laws;  imprecise  drafting  of  laws  which  makes  two  or  more
interpretations  possible;  contradictory  drafting  in  different  laws;  technical  errors,  and
subsidiary implementing regulations not consistent with governing law. All of the above
creates uncertainty of present legal environment in Georgia and definitely do not support
business activity in the country.
A  weak  rule  of  law  is  an  important  obstacle  to  FDI  in  Georgia.  Investors  often
discover debts not known at the time of due diligence and courts are often of little
assistance in resolving these kind of problems. In several cases, a court decisions have
lead to changes of control of enterprises. For example, a court decision reversed the
privatization to foreign investors of Chateau Zegaani Winery, and the investors have been
unable  to  reverse  decision  or  obtain  compensation.  Moreover,  other  investors  face
continuous  interference  by  the  judiciary  in  areas  usually  regarded  as  a  commercial
prerogative, e.g., orders to reinstate workers fired for corrupt practices. 
To  summarize,  investment  regulations  and  enforcement  of  new  laws  are  often
problematic, and the overall impact of ongoing judicial reforms on private investors is not
yet markedly positive. 
3.2. Macroeconomic Conditions
In the aftermath of the breakdown of the Soviet Union, internal armed conflict and
the  war  in  Abkhazia,  during  the  first  years  of  independence  Georgia  experienced
significant economic crisis. In 1992–1993 GDP reduced almost by 70 per cent. The
14
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economy shifted to the shadow sector. The government unable to collect taxes had to
get external debt resulting in significant foreign outstanding arrears. In the same time
huge  monetary  emissions  caused  hyperinflation  (percentage  change  in  end-year
consumer prices amounted about 7488 per cent in 1993 and 6474 per cent in 1994).
In 1994 government initiated the process of intensive system transformation based on,
in general terms, a transition to a market economy and involved economic liberalization
accompanied by the privatization of the state-owned sector. In 1995 national currency – lari
(GEL)  was  introduced  and  a  number  of  reforms  were  implemented  to  stabilize  and
liberalize  the  Georgian  economy.  Subsequent  macroeconomic  reforms  aimed  at
strengthening the budget, enforcing national currency stability, reducing inflation rate and
ensuring economic growth.
In the following years significant progress has been achieved in establishing relative
macroeconomic stability (see Table 4). Inflation has sharply fallen and reached the level of
4.5 per cent in 2000. After a massive output decline, real GDP started to increase,
showed solid growth in 1996 and 1997 (11.2 percent and 10.7 percent, respectively),
stabilized at the level of about 3 percent in 1998 and 1999, and decreased to 1.9 per cent
in 2000. Deficit of the state budget decreased from 6.6 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 4.5
per cent of GDP in 1999 (3.7 percent of GDP in 1998) and 3.5 percent in 2000. However,
as presented in Table 4, most of basic macroeconomic indicators experience significant
fluctuations.
Georgia  has  adopted  a  managed  floating  exchange  rate  regime,  which  has  rised
confidence in the lari. The National Bank of Georgia strategy has been to intervene in the
foreign exchange market if necessary to prevent a depreciation of lari.
Table 4. Basic macroeconomic indicators 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Nominal GDP (million lari) 3768.0 4504.7 4794.6 5593.8 5955.1
Real GDP growth (% Y to Y) 11.2 10.7 2.9 3.0 1.8
Inflation (CPI) 41.6 7.0 3.5 19.3 4.1
Budget deficit (% GDP) 6.6 5.9 3.7 4.5 3.5
International reserves (USD
billion-end of period)
190.2 200.3 123.6 132.9 112.9
Export (USD billion) 309.9 376.5 299.9 329.6 459.4
Import (USD billion) 897.5 1162.8 994.5 863.4 965.5
Trade balance (USD billion) -587.5 -786.3 -694.6 -533.8 -506.1
Balance of payments (USD
billion)
-569.5 -513.8 -275.6 -195.1 -262.4
Exchange rate (period
average)
1.2621 1.2975 1.3915 2.0194 1.98Reforms of tax legislation, and as a result, improvement of the tax base played a
substantial role in realization of tax and fiscal program. However, notwithstanding the
rate of improvement in budgetary revenue collection, there are still serious difficulties.
The main reasons for budget revenues shortfall are: The shadow economy, tax evasion,
low  level  of  registration,  as  well  as  the  poor  financial  conditions  of  enterprises  and
organizations. To summarize: fiscal difficulties continue from year to year. 
Deficit financing in Georgia is carried out mainly through loans from the National
Bank of Georgia (by direct borrowing) and loans from abroad (mainly from international
organizations). Persistent relatively large budget deficits and problems with their financing
as well as obligations of debt service give impetus for exchange rate fluctuations and
increases the probability of exchange rate crisis.
The labor market in Georgia is relatively free and open. Minimum wage is binding for
both  private  and  public  sector  employees.  Wage  negotiations  take  place  between
employees and employers. Trade unions are not politically powerful (the major reason for
this is that they represent workers in formal economy, and hence exclude the sizable
number of workers in the informal economy (estimated in1997 at 750000). Some local
and small scale strikes have taken place among teachers, pensioners, and workers in the
energy and transport sectors due to lack of payment of wages. The unemployment rate
(based on LFS definition) which was at 17.6 in 1999 decreased to about 15.2 percent in
2000  (Table  5).  It  is  likely  that  under-employment  and  hidden  employment  remain
widespread. 
Real wages in the formal sector after some increase in 1997 and 1998 contracted
reflecting impact of higher inflation at the end of 1998.  Despite the gains made earlier
years, monthly wages remain very low at about US$ 30 (as in 1999).
To  summarize.  Since  mid-1994,  the  Georgian  authorities  has  been  implementing
stabilization and structural reform program, however, observed persistence of relatively
large budget deficits, problems with their financing, and vulnerable exchange reserves
position, suggests that macroeconomic environment in Georgia still cannot be considered
as stable.
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Table. 5. Labor market indicators
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Nominal average wages (lari) 29.0 42.5 55.4 63.4 76.5
Unemployment rate (LFS-end
of period)
16.8 8.8 13.7 17.6 15.94. FDI in Unstable Economic Environment
In this section we present a simple formal model describing the process of decision
making concerning FDI in unstable macroeconomic and legal environment. The purpose
of the model is to show the impact of business uncertainty on the decisions of foreign
firms concerning direct investment in the country. Therefore, in order to focus directly
on the problem we do not include explicitly to the model a number of issues related to
underdeveloped  infrastructure  and  banking  system,  bureaucracy  or  widespread
corruption, which are undoubtedly taken into account in the process of FDI decision
making.
4.1. The Model
Consider a single commodity market in a given country. For the sake of simplicity
assume that this particular commodity is not produced in this country, but demand is
satisfied by import. Suppose that the unit price of this commodity is determined in the
world market and equals Pworld (assume also that world price is determined in US dollars).
Market demand for this commodity in the country under study is described by inverse
demand function P(x), where x denotes the volume of the commodity supplied to the
market  (x≥ 0),  P(x) is  a  market  price  in  national  currency  (we  suppose  that  inverse
demand function is continuous and twice differentiable, so that dP(x)/dx<0, d2P(x)/dx2≥ 0).
Suppose, now, that there exists a foreign company, which considers the possibility to
produce the commodity under consideration inside the country. To make a decision the
company  has  to  analyze  profitability  of  the  investment.  In  particular,  if  there  is  no
uncertainty in the market, the decision makers have to compare discounted stream of
future profits yield by the investment with the cost of the investment in the present (both
future profits and the investment cost in the present have to be expressed in foreign
currency, e.g., in US dollars). Furthermore, assume that if the production process is
already established, marginal production cost does not depend on the volume of output
(i.e., is constant), and the cost function is specified as C(x) = cx+F , where c denotes
constant marginal cost, F stands for fixed costs. For simplicity suppose that all costs are
expressed in national currency and do not depend on the exchange rate (i.e., assume,
that only local resources are used in the production process). 
Since the commodity can be imported at the world price, then if the production of
the  commodity  is  established  inside  the  country,  the  company  can  sell  the  volume
17
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foreign currency (US dollar) in the country considered (expressed as a number of units
of local currency for one unit of foreign currency). Furthermore, suppose that price of
import  (in  terms  of  local  currency)  ePworld restrict  the  possibility  to  fully  exploit  the
monopoly  power  on  the  domestic  market  which  the  company  could  have  (i.e,
c<ePworld<Pm, where Pm denotes monopolistic price in local currency), and consequently,
that investing company will not be able to earn monopolistic profit (see Fig. 1).
Consequently, in fully deterministic case in each particular period (for example, a
year) profit of the company is determined as π (x) = ePx -cx - F , where x is the volume
of output produced and supplied to the market, P – is the market price in local currency
of the unit of commodity (P≤ ePworld).
Obviously, in order to determine firm's profit in subsequent periods (knowing demand
curve and price of commodity unit in the world market) one has to know estimations of
exchange rate and production cost. It has to be stressed, however, that both exchange rate
and cost of production, in general, depend on a number of macroeconomic indicators and
contemporary legal regulations. In particular, exchange rate can be influenced by the value
of budget deficit, level of foreign reserves, balance of payments deficit, inflation, etc. Tax
code and other judicial regulations determine a number of items included in the calculation
of the cost of production, such as for example:
– costs incurred in the start-up and implementation of production;
–  costs  incurred  in  connection  with  the  production  process  (materials,  tooling,
current maintenance etc.);
– costs for environmental protection measures;
–  expenses  associated  with  the  management  of  the  production  process  (e.g.
mandatory audits, certification of products and business trips (within the limits stipulated
by law);
– expenses for salaries and wages;
– expenses for training and retraining of employees;
– expenses for mandatory social security and pension payments and for voluntary
social benefits provided to employees (e.g. cafeterias, transportation services);
– depreciation of fixed and intangible assets;
– costs incurred in marketing and selling products;
– payments for banking services.
Usually, values of macroeconomic indicators (or data required for the estimation of
these  indicators)  are  determined  based  on  official  forecasts  of  Ministry  of  Finance,
National  Statistical  Committee,  National  Bank,  predictions  of  investment  banks  and
organizations involved into economic research, and own intuition of analysts and decision
18
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makers. An important issue is that, typically, all these forecasts differ from each other
(often significantly). Moreover, legal framework in most of transition economies is not
stable as well. Therefore, the decision concerning FDI is made in uncertain environment
(i.e., based on the number of predictions and forecasts). In the present model, we assume
that in each subsequent period the firm faces only exchange rate uncertainty (resulted
from unstable macroeconomic environment), and uncertainty about marginal cost of
production  (resulted  from  unstable  legislation).  Since  for  each  forecast  there  exists
certain  probability  that  it  will  be  a  true  value,  exchange  rate  and  marginal  cost  of
production  are  considered  as  random  variables,  described  by  certain  probability
distribution (known at the moment of decision making).
In the simplest case, each period firm's expectations concerning exchange rate and
marginal cost of production are specified in the form of two probability distributions:
(1) exchange rate probability distribution,
(2) marginal cost probability distribution,
(in general, these distribution can change from period to period).
For simplicity assume, that both random variables under consideration (exchange











Notes: Pm,  xm –  monopolistic  price  and  output,  respectively;    ePworld world  price  expressed  in  local
currency (maximum possible price for domestically produced commodity unit); x* – optimal output; MC –
marginal cost; MR – marginal revenue.20
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rate  and  marginal  cost)  are  independent,  and  in  each  of  the  distributions  only  two
outcomes are possible, i.e., that each random variable with certain probability can take
higher value and with certain probability – lower value. In particular, assume that
– probability that the exchange rate of the national currency versus foreign currency
(US dollar) will be low (i.e., exchange rate will be equal to e ) equals r (0<r<1), and
probability that the exchange rate of the national currency versus foreign currency (US
dollar) will be high (i.e., exchange rate will be equal to e ) equals (1-r);
–  probability  that  marginal  cost  of  production  will  be  low  (equal  to  c)  equals  q
(0<q<1), and probability that marginal cost of production will be high (equal to c ) equals
(1-q). 
Consequently,  in  each  period  of  time  the  following  four  different  outcomes  are
possible:
(1) Low exchange rate and high marginal cost of production (probability: r (1-q)),
(2) Low exchange rate and low marginal cost of production (probability: r q),
(3) High exchange rate and high marginal cost of production (probability: (1-r)(1-q)),
(4) High exchange rate and low marginal cost of production (probability: (1-r) q).
In each of the possible outcomes profit of the firm specified in units of national
currency is determined as
.
Moreover, assume that firms are managed according to the wishes of their owners
who are typical asset holders, and the decisions in each firm are made by a group of
decision-makers  with  sufficiently  similar  preferences  to  guarantee  the  existence  of  a
group-preference  function,  representable  by  a  von  Neuman-Morgenstern  utility
function6. Given these conditions we assume risk aversion, so that utility function of each
firm (U) is strictly concave7. To simplify the analysis assume that the exact shape of the
utility function U is specified as follows: 
F x c Px e x − − = ) ( 1 π
F x c Px e x − − = ) ( 2 π
F x c Px e x − − = ) ( 4 π
F x c Px e x − − = ) ( 3 π
6 See Sandmo (1971) for discussion. 
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where  a>b>c>d>0,  and  the  volume  of  output  produced  is  such  that
π 1<Π 1<π 2<Π 2<π 3<Π 3<π 4 (see Figure 2). To simplify notation we denote:  
b0=(a-b)Π 1,  c0=(b-c)Π 2+(a-b)Π 1,  and  d0=(c-d)Π 3+(b-c)Π 2+(a-b)Π 1.
Making decisions about the volume of output risk averse firm does not maximize
profit, but instead it maximizes expected utility from profit (because lower profit with
lower risk could be sometimes better for a firm than higher profit with higher risk).
Therefore, making investment decisions the company has to compare discounted stream
of  expected  utility  form  future  profits  from  the  investment  (expressed  in  foreign
currency) with the cost of the investment (expressed in foreign currency) at present.
Formally, the firm analyses the value specified by the expression:
,
where: I – the cost of the investment in foreign currency at the present, 
E – expectation operator, 
β –  discounting coefficient  (β ∈ (0,1)),
T – time horizon of the investment.
Figure  2.  Formal  description  of  the  firm's  attitude  towards  risk  (risk  averse  utility
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4.2. Analysis of the Model and Basic Results
In order to make a decision concerning location of the investment the firm has to
estimate the value specified by the expression above and compare it with certain target
value. If the value computed exceeds a target value then the firm makes decision about
the  investment  in  this  location.  Taking  into  account  that  discounting  factor  is  an
exogenous variable specific for each company, and time horizon and investment cost are
specific for each particular investment, the value of discounted stream of expected utility
form future profits yielded by the investment (expressed in foreign currency) depends
only upon the value of expected utility from profit in each particular period of time. It is
clear that the expected utility from profit in each particular period8
increases if
– expected value of the exchange rate increases (local currency becomes cheaper)9, 
– expected value of marginal cost of production decreases.
It is not obvious, however, how the expected utility from profit in each particular
period depends (or if it depends at all) on the variability (i.e., on the variance or standard
deviation) of the exchange rate and marginal cost of production. In Appendix, we present
a formal proofs of the following propositions:
PROPOSITION 1. In each particular period of time the expected utility form profit is
inversely related to the variability of marginal production cost.
PROPOSITION 2. In each particular period of time the expected utility from profit is
inversely related to the exchange rate variability .
Propositions presented above describe the relationship between the expected utility
from profit and the variance (or variability) of the exchange rate and marginal production
cost. Since higher values of the expected utility from profit in each period of time makes
the positive investment decision more likely the following conclusion can be made based
on the propositions above: 
Economic stability (reduction of the variability of forecasted variables) stimulate
the inflow of foreign direct investment to the country10, and vice versa, economic
unstability reduces inflow of foreign direct investment to the country.
[]
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8 In order to simplify notation we skip subscript t.
9 Assuming that the exchange rate does not affect the cost of production. 
10 Since it increases the value of the discounted stream of the expected utility from profit.23
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It has to be mentioned that in the simple model presented above we focused only
on two possible probability distributions. However, it has to be taken into account that
probability  distribution  of  the  exchange  rate  depends  upon  a  number  of
macroeconomic variables (including forecasted variables), such as inflation, expected
budget deficit, trade deficit, balance of payments deficit, etc. Similarly, probability
distribution of marginal production cost depends upon expected distribution of tax
burden,  social  payments,  level  of  wage,  corruption  etc.  Consequently,  economic
instability and increase in variability of each of forecasted factor leads, ceteris paribus,
to the reduction of FDI inflow.
On the other hand, it is also necessary to take into account other factors that increase
value of expected utility from profit, and consequently, affect the results of FDI decision
making, such as:
– size of the market (increase in market size can be achieved by reduction of trade
barriers, and participation in regional trade/custom unions),
– infrastructure (improvement in infrastructure may reduce production, transportation
or communication costs),
– FDI legal framework (increase in transparency and reduction of the possibility of
different understanding of legal regulations can reduce corruption, and consequently, cost of
the investment as a whole),
– time requirements and complexity of bureaucratic procedures (extensive bureaucratic
procedures lead to ineffective utilization of financial resources, and therefore, corresponding
changes may decrease the cost of investment). 
Another important issue is related to the problem of attracting investors, which
are focused not on risky buying/selling operations, but, instead, on stable long term
investments. As it has been argued in the model, in reality (and in advanced economic
theory)  firms  are  characterized  by  risk  aversion.  However,  not  all  the  firms  are
identical, some of them are less and the other are more risk averse. Taking into
account that the value of  the discounted stream of the expected utility from future
profits depends on the attitude of the firm towards risk the following proposition can
be proven (see Appendix for the formal proof):
PROPOSITION 3. Under uncertainty the value of the expected utility from profit in each
particular period is inversely related to the degree of risk aversion of the decision making firm.
Consequently, it may happen that the value of  the discounted stream of the expected
utility from future profits could be to little for serious long-term investors (characterized by
high risk aversion), but it could be satisfactory for less risk averse firms (or risk loving firms),
which are more interested in speculative transactions than in long term investment. Finally,
it can be concluded that:24
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Unstable economic situation may result in adverse selection of investors, i.e., it
may happen that only firms interested in short run speculative transactions are
ready to invest in the country. 
Obviously, such an investment is not demanded by any country aiming to attract FDI.
5. International Experience in Reforming FDI Regime
According to the old paradigm of FDI seen over the world until end of sixties, there are
essentially  two  motivations  for  foreign  direct  investment:  access  to  some  inputs  for
production  (natural  resource  deposits,  low-cost  labor,  etc.),  and  access  to  markets  for
outputs.  The  attraction  of  inputs  continues  to  be  important  to  this  day  although  the
importance of low-cost labor is decreasing. Countries that were strong in one or both of
these attractions received a lot of FDI (e.g., Brazil during 1950s and 1960s). In contrary,
countries without large and growing markets, or without natural resources or very cheap
labor, were not important for FDI. Input-seeking FDI greatly increased trade and in fact was
dependent  upon  it.  Market-seeking  FDI  was  a  substitute  for  trade  and  in  many  cases
dependent  on  trade  restrictions.  Moreover,  most  FDI  in  those  days  was  "greenfield"
investment, i.e., embodied in the construction of new factories.
In contrary to market-seeking and resource-seeking FDI, the last decade has seen the
rise of a new kind of FDI called "globalizing" FDI (40–60% of total FDI during nineties). A
significant part of it has not been connected with greenfield activities but instead with
mergers and acquisitions. The dominant motivating force behind mergers and acquisition
activity has been to rationalize and strengthen the competitive edge of the investing
company by giving it facilities for global or regional strategies of creating interdependent
production, administration, research and development, accounting, design, etc. Although
mergers and acquisition are usually accompanied by some increase in physical capacity,
the driving force is the search for worldwide efficiency and competitive advantage. The
general trend is that countries try to create favorable conditions for foreign investors with
bilateral agreements and regional trade packs. Only in 1997 more than 150 amendments
were made in the investment codes of 76 countries, 86 per cent of which were positive
for the investment climate, while only 16 per cent were negative. Many measures were
aimed at opening up previously closed sectors like telecommunication, television and
radio broadcasting, and energy. Other measures included simplifying licensing procedures
and authorizing more special economic zones. The best example of the host countries for
such kind of FDI is Brazil where only in one month in 1998 FDI amounted to 10 billion25
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USD. If former communist countries are concerned, Hungary is one of the world leaders
in attracting FDI without natural resources or very cheap labor (it is estimated that about
50% of FDI inflow to transition countries of Central Europe was related to "globalizing"
FDI). Another example is Mexico, which very successful FDI liberalization reform is
shortly characterized below11. 
Mexico new regulations issued in 1989 liberalized FDI establishment in several ways, and
were complemented by liberalization of regulatory practice (which was very important
although informal). Formally, majority Mexican equity was no longer required, except in a
few sectors (banking, oil, electricity) if the proposed investment met certain criteria. In
practice virtually, every normal investment was deemed to met these criteria, and permission
was given automatically and quickly (exceptions were undesirable activities such as toxic
waste dumps, casinos gambling, weapons assembly, nuclear technology etc.). The regulations
also simplified the registration procedures for foreign investors, and removed or simplified
restrictions  and  red  tape  that  had  previously  been  involved  in  government  approval  of
various aspects of technology transfers. Overall, the change in Mexico's attitude toward FDI
went far beyond the change in regulations. It switched from suspicion and regulation, to
promotion and facilitation. All of this together with some recovery in domestic demand
increased FDI in 1989 to the amount of about 3 billion USD. However, in 1990 it fell by 10%.
The response of Mexico to this was NAFTA, the free trade agreement with the US and
Canada approved in 1994 and further formal liberalization of FDI (in particular, it reduced
any uncertainty that investors might have about the future of FDI in the country). The results
of such policy is presented in Table 5.
As the example of active measures to improve investment climate in former Soviet
Union countries we can consider FDI liberalization in Russia and Kazakhstan.
Since the beginning of nineties the Russian government has been undertaking active
measures to improve its investment climate. In particular, currently it is actively reducing
taxes in order to stimulate growth of private income and development of domestic market.
Proposed tax reforms should reduce taxes by 2 per cent of GDP . A flat 13 per cent income
tax has been proposed that should increase transparency of company finances. Social fund
payments will be reduced from 38.5 per cent to 36 per cent. To make up lost revenue, the
package of measures includes reducing the number of tax deductions and exemptions (for
private scientific organizations, housing construction, and personal charitable donations) and
increasing excise taxes on petrol, cigarettes and alcohol. It has to be emphasized, however,
that  the  reforms  may  have  negative  effects  (increased  petrol  taxes  may  harm  the
competitiveness of some businesses).
11 Based on Bergsman, Broadman, Drebebtsov (2000).26
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In  Kazakhstan,  the  law  "On  State  Support  to  Foreign  Investments"  provides  the
following privileges and preferences: state grants for in-kind assistance; 100% reduction
the basic tax rate on income, land and property for up to the first five years and 50% for
next five years; full or partial relief from customs duty for imported equipment, materials
and raw materials used in the business. The degree of privileges and preferences is based
on the amount of investment, sector and expected payback period. The law guarantees
the right to: sell or transfer ownership, property, income and profit; open bank accounts
and convert funds into hard currency; take advantage of special incentives in the customs
regulations; receive protection of investments, profits, dividends, and legal rights, and
noninterference of state bodies and officials in the company's management. In priority
sectors  of  the  economy  Kazakhstan's  State  Committee  on  Foreign  Investments
determines the amount, nature and duration of the privileges and preferences based on
their evaluation of the criteria, which may include the following: land tax, property tax,
income tax, customs duties, and state grants for in-kind assistance. Income taxes may be
reduced when, after other incentives are taken into account, an investment still does not
provide an adequate rate of return. Temporary exemption or reductions in property
taxes  are  granted  for  building  new  industrial  capacity  or  investment  in  agriculture.







1989 3.0 30 New FDI regulations – elimination of
51% of Mexican majority in most sectors
1990 2.6 40 Privatization of telephones, mining, steel,
tourism, airlines
1991 4.8 50 NAFTA negotiation begin
1992 4.4 60 Privatization of banks, financial system
reforms
1993 4.4 60 Imminent NAFTA approval, new FDI law
codifying the 1989 regulations, more
privatization
1993 11.0 70 NAFTA approval, relaxed FDI
restrictions
1995 9.5 80 Economic crisis, deregulation in gas
electricity
1996 7.6 90 Banking system opening FDI
1997 12.1 90 Long distance telephone,
communications deregulations
Source: Bank of Mexico.Exemptions or reduced tax rates are also available when a significant investment in new
capital involves losses in initial years. Depending on the type of investment activity and its
economic prospects, investors may be able to assume possession of existing production
facilities  free  of  charge  together  with  their  intangible  assets,  inventories  and  other
properties. Investors are offered partial or full exemption from import duties on modern
capital equipment, raw materials and components necessary for project implementation.
Imported equipment, components and raw materials are fully exempt from import duties
when used in newly built facilities engaged in production for export. The exemptions are
granted based on two criteria: (i) the investment's pertinence to economy priorities; and
(ii) the total investment does not exceed 10 million USD. The schedule of tax privileges
used  by  the  State  Committee  on  Investment  depends  directly  on  the  amount  of
investment and differs somewhat from privileges base on economic priorities.
It has to be stressed however that all these privileges and preferences do not help much
to attract FDI if economic, political and legal situation is not stable.
Finally, we should mention that the empirical evidence from other foreign countries which
shows that inflow of FDI is largely a consequence of previous economic growth. The People's
Republic of China and Vietnam are examples of countries that have succeeded in attracting
substantial amounts of FDI because they have maintained rapid rates of growth during their
transitions.  Crucial  factors  in  achieving  rapid  growth  have  been  domestic  savings  and
investment.  Gross  domestic  investment  was  40  per  cent  of  GDP  in  China  in  1999,  for
example, but the savings rate was even higher, namely, 42 per cent of GDP . At the same time,
official development assistance was a miniscule 0.3 per cent of GDP and external debt was
only 15 per cent of GDP . 
6. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
It should be acknowledged that Georgia has been recently constantly and explicitly trying
to attract FDI and hence make the FDI regime more attractive. However, a relatively small
amount of accumulated FDI suggests that the government has not been very successful. Of
course, the lack of political and economic stability has been an important stumbling block and
even an excellent policy towards FDI would not suffice to overweigh that.  The general
political  situation  has  also  not  been  considered  as  stable.  The  democratic  process  has
withstood several potential threats, including two assassination attempts against President
Shevardnadze (September 1995 and January 1998). The Abkhazia region (and to lesser
extend Ossetia) continues to contest Georgian sovereignty while the autonomous region
27
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 39 – Determinants of Foreign Direct ...28
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 39 – J. Cukrowski, G. Kavelashvili
Ajara periodically challenges central authority. Moreover, the regional situation remains tense
with Russian military activity in both Chechnya and Dagestan. 
The other, and one of the most damaging elements is the tax system, in which instability,
a  heavy  burden,  and  arbitrary  enforcement  are  major  deterrent  to  foreign  investors.
Moreover, there need to be stepped up efforts in dealing with crime, corruption, luck of
security of property and persons, and enforcements of contracts. Even when appropriate
legislation exists, the courts are unable to enforce procedures and outcomes. It is important
to strengthen the legal/judicial framework to allow for credible property rights and adequate
contract enforcement. It has to be acknowledged  that Georgia (as many other CIS country)
has paid increasing attention to the problem of corruption (there is ongoing debate on this
issue). We have also to stress that there is no single solution to this problem, but recent
insights suggests that corruption arises when institutions have monopoly positions, there is
the  ability  to  exercise  discretion  and  incentives  for  accountability  are  weak.  Therefore,
additional laws are unlikely to bring about significant reduction in corruption, but instead
effective reform must be directed to changing the system in the following directions (see
Bergsman, Broadman and Drebentsov, 2000): (i) introduction of independent oversight of
agencies; (ii) clarifying and making transparent how much official discretion can be exercised;
and (iii) utilizing penalties and rewards for conduct.
To  summarize,  to  be  on  the  top  of  the  list  of  countries  for  extended  FDI  and
multinational production Georgian authorities have to take into account the following list
of factors driving FDI inflow:
– political and economic stability (to reduce investment risk and provide reasonable
predictability for making business decisions);
– government behavior that facilitates doing business, rather than harassing it;
– an FDI legal framework in line with the best international practice (with security of
property and of persons and enforceability of contracts);
– an enabling environment for domestic market growth, including adequately developed
infrastructure and human capital;
– the availability of all these conditions to all companies automatically and by law (without
a need for a special treatment and discretionary decisions by officials or civil servants).
The most serious challenge Georgia faces at the moment is to switch from an obsolete
approach towards attracting foreign investment to modern one. The former (old one), in
case of Georgia, involves relatively high tariff protection of domestic market, and on top of
that, specific privileges offered to FDI. The latter approach would require getting rid of both
sticks and carrots, and providing foreign investors with a stable business environment and
generic climate conductive for attracting capital. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider discrete probability distribution of random marginal
production cost, such that only two outcomes are possible: 
– low marginal cost (equal to c ) with probability q (0<q<1)
– high marginal cost (equal to c ) with probability 1-q.
Expected value of the marginal cost equals q c+(1-q) c. Taking into account that utility
function can be represented using its piecewise linear approximation (see Section 4.1) the
expected utility from profit can be specified as 
.
Assume now that standard deviation of marginal cost increases, but expected value of
marginal cost remains constant, i.e., that if  c increases by ξ , c decreases by
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N ξ ξIt is straightforward from the expressions above that for any particular volume of output
x: M>M*, if a>b and  N>N*, if c>d. Taking into account inequalities above and the fact that
linear combination (with positive coefficients) of M and N is always greater that analogous
linear combination of M* and N*, we can conclude that the expected utility from profit with
bigger standard deviation of marginal cost  E [U(π /e)]* is always smaller than the expected
utility  from  profit  with  smaller  standard  deviation  of  marginal  cost  E  [U(π /e)],  and,
consequently, that the expected utility form profit is inversely related to the variability of
marginal production cost (note that the result derived does not depend on the period of
time, i.e., its is valid for any period of time).
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider discrete probability distribution of the exchange rate,
such that only two outcomes are possible: 
– low exchange rate (equal to e ) with probability r (0<r<1)
– high exchange rate (equal to e ) with probability 1-r.
Expected value of the exchange rate equals re +(1-r) e. Taking into account that utility
function can be represented using its piecewise linear approximation (see Section 4.1.) the
expected utility from profit can be specified as 
.
Assume now that standard deviation of the exchange rate increases, but its expected
value remains constant, i.e., that if  e increases by ξ , e decreases by
.
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It is straightforward from the expressions above that S>S*, if 
.
Since the right hand side of the inequality above is always smaller than one, and its left
hand side is always greater than one, the inequality above is always satisfied. Similarly, one
can show that T>T*. 
Taking into account that S>S* and T>T*, and the fact that linear combination (with
positive coefficients) of S and T is always greater that analogous linear combination of S*
and  T*,  we  can  conclude  that  the  expected  utility  from  profit  with  bigger  standard
deviation of the exchange rate E [U(π /e)]* is always smaller than the expected utility from
profit with smaller standard deviation of the exchange rate E [U(π /e)], and, consequently,
that the expected utility form profit is inversely related to the exchange rate variability
(note that the result derived does not depend on the period of time, i.e., its is valid for
any period of time).
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider discrete probability distribution of random marginal
production cost, such that only two outcomes are possible: 
– low marginal cost (equal to c ) with probability q (0<q<1)
– high marginal cost (equal to c ) with probability 1-q.
Assume that utility function can be represented using its piecewise linear approximation
(see Section 4.1). Furthermore, suppose that there are two potential firms-investors having
different attitude towards risk:
(1) long-term investor with strong risk aversion,
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ξ(2) short-run speculative investor almost neutral towards risk (i.e., with relatively small
risk aversion).
Denote coefficients of the piecewise linear approximation of the utility functions of these
two investors with the help of subscripts  1 and 2, respectively. It is clear that for two
investors with the attitude towards risk described above the following is true:
a1≤ b2, b1≤ b2, c1≤ c2, d1≤ d2,
b1,0≤ b2,0, c1,0≤ c2,0, d1,0≤ d20,
and at least one, out of seven inequalities presented above, is strong. Consequently, the utility
function  of  the  investor  2 is  less  concave  than  the  utility  function  of  investor  1 (this
corresponds to smaller risk aversion of the investor 2). 
The expected utility form profit of investor 1, is specified as
,
while the expected utility form profit of investor 2 can be represented as 
.
It is straightforward (assuming that the shapes of the utility functions are as described
above) that E2[U(π /e)] < E1[U(π /e)] , and, consequently, that the expected utility from profit
is inversely related to risk aversion of the investor (note that the result derived does not
depend on the period of time, i.e., its is valid for any period of time).
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